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Ukrainian Missile Strikes Disrupt Russian Military Semiconductor Supply

Peter Zeihan reports that Ukrainian cruise missile attacks have set fire to the Verezna military semiconductor facility in south-central Russia (near the Caucasus), which has served military needs since 1959, producing and packaging chips for fighter jets, tanks, and missiles. The Russian military industrial complex relies almost entirely on this plant and the smaller Zelenograd cluster (three facilities northwest of Moscow) for domestic chip manufacturing. Clean-room devastation likely cripples Verezna, and Zeihan predicts Zelenograd will soon be targeted, noting its lesser anti-air defenses.

Russian military chips are technologically outdated—"the most advanced semiconductors" produced at Verezna and Zelenograd are "about 90 nanometers", scaling back to 150nm, with only 350nm chips made without foreign equipment. The sophisticated, low-volume exceptions depend on imported tools. At full capacity, Russian gear production was already only "one fifth to one twentieth the rate" at which equipment was destroyed in combat, creating major supply problems.

Ukraine’s attacks now threaten to cut off Russia’s ability to replenish military hardware, affecting guidance systems, IR equipment, and glide bombs dropped from fighter jets (often "20 miles from the front line"), as well as long-range missile strikes. While chips scavenged from consumer devices or imported from China can fill some gaps, Zeihan warns their high failure rates and lack of "hardened" military specs render them unreliable—especially for critical hardware like hypersonic missiles.

In the immediate future, the only advanced weapons available to Russia will be those already assembled or en route; replacement rates and quality will collapse. Conventional hardware—helicopters, jets, tanks, missiles—faces imminent "qualitative collapse" and quantitative limits even with Chinese help. Meanwhile, Ukraine now leads technologically and numerically in drones, bolstered by European and Arab Gulf investment, as the US support wanes. The Russian side depends solely on China for chips, and "they insist on getting paid."

Zeihan forecasts a "significant change in how this war is fought" over the summer: Russia must either counter drone attacks without microchips (unlikely), deploy weapon systems such as tactical nukes (with "complications"), or press China for direct, political involvement. The "long, slow grind" of the previous three years is ending, and the war is poised to become "a lot more dynamic very, very soon".