It costs $25 to steal your house.

The speaker lays out how deed thieves exploit public records and cheap forgeries to take paid‑off homes, using the real case of Robin Mobley, Dayton, Ohio, as a running example. Mobley won in court but is still not listed as owner on paper because the judge's order omitted the property description; while the appeal drags on she faces years of back property taxes, unpaid water bills, and at least $10,000 in mold damage. The typical attacker spends about $25 in Clark County (about $42 with extras) to file a fake deed and targets profiles with maximum equity and no lender oversight: houses that are free and clear, owned by older, away, or recently widowed people. The speaker cites a California financial regulator alert (June) and a National Association of Realtors consumer guide (March) documenting cheaper, higher‑quality forgeries and deep fakes.

He prescribes three defenses, each reproducible tonight: (1) Visibility controls: search your address on your county assessor site, Zillow, and Redfin; ask Zillow and Redfin to remove interior photos and listing history; ask Google to blur your house on Street View (the blur is permanent); call your county recorder and ask, 'Do you offer free recording alerts?' — those alerts act as a smoke detector. (2) Stop the data supply: opt out of data broker sites and stop feeding brokers with real emails and phone numbers by using forwarding aliases; the speaker uses a paid service called 'cloaked' to automate opt‑outs and generate alias emails/phones and reports it removed his data from 839 brokers. (3) Change the recorded owner: move the house into a properly written trust so the public record shows a generic trust name (not your family name); this removes your name from search results and works in all 50 states, while also simplifying inheritance and avoiding probate. He contrasts attacker costs (~$42) with victim costs: quiet title litigation can take six months or longer and run from a few thousand dollars up to $50,000 or far more, with documented six‑figure cases.

Practical takeaway: apply all three cheap defenses — visibility controls, data‑supply cuts, and a generic trust title — because they materially reduce attack surface and pay off even if no thief appears. The speaker also points to hidemyequity.com as a starting place for trust services and notes '16 different states' lack specific deed fraud laws.