Why Nobody Came to Help the U.S in Iran || Peter Zeihan
Zeihan on Geopolitics
Peter Zeihan on Allied Inaction During the US-Iran Conflict Initiated Under Trump
Peter Zeihan addresses a Patreon question on why energy-import-dependent countries like Japan and European nations have not intervened in the US-led conflict around the Persian Gulf, despite their reliance on the region. He identifies three main factors:
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Limited Allied Naval Power Projection: Most navies except those of the United States, Japan (second largest navy in the world), United Kingdom ("imperial hangover"), and France (maintains independent capacity) lack rapid, long-range deployment capabilities for global intervention. Ships are generally docked and require weeks to months for deployment; only these three could hypothetically have helped, but even then, not in time for immediate crisis response.
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Post-WWII Security Arrangements: The US keeps global ocean trade routes open in exchange for controlling allies' security policies, explicitly discouraging long-range military projection from other nations to avoid unpredictability. This policy leaves allies dependent and purposefuly under-resourced for large-scale interventions outside coastal patrol.
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Lack of Intelligence and Diplomatic Coordination: On February 11, Benjamin Netanyahu pitched to President Trump a joint US-Israeli attack on Iran, claiming 'the war would be over in four days.' Despite warnings from Secretary of State Rubio, Joint Chief Staff Dean Kane, and others citing decades of similar requests from Netanyahu and flawed 'math,' Trump was convinced by figures with no foreign policy experience (such as Pete Heggseth) and launched immediate action. No proper intelligence-sharing or coalition formation with NATO, Japan or the UK took place, violating standard US procedure for burden-sharing and international legitimacy.
As the war progressed, Trump began pressuring allies to send forces, but none had deployable assets, and those capable (France, UK) would require months for mobilization. By this point, Iran demonstrated its ability to destroy Persian Gulf infrastructure with drones and monitored the Strait of Hormuz so effectively it could threaten ships in Omani waters. US Navy concentration in the area offered no decisive counter, and the risk of triggering a 'global energy induced depression' became clear.
Diplomatic channels were also broken: Trump sidelined the Department of State and the National Security Council, leaving technical talks with Iran unaddressed. Preferred negotiators Jared Kushner and Steve Whitcoff were rebuffed in Doha; no technical talks have occurred since February. Zeihan concludes allies have neither incentive nor capability to support a US-initiated war that threatens their economies, and the diplomatic process is stymied by Trump's refusal to surround himself with policy experts and his susceptibility to manipulation, chiefly by Netanyahu. The current geopolitical trap is caused by the convergence of these military, policy, and leadership failures.
